Business Roundtable v. SEC: Rising Judicial Mistrust and the Onset of a New Era in Judicial Review of Securities Regulation by Al-Alami, Leen
AL ALAMI - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013 1:21 PM 
 
541 
Comments 
 
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE V. SEC: RISING JUDICIAL 
MISTRUST AND THE ONSET OF A NEW ERA IN 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
Leen Al-Alami

  
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 542 
I.BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 543 
A. Setting the Stage:  From New York to Washington, D.C........ 543 
B. Judicial Review of Agency Rules ............................................ 545 
C. Judicial Review of SEC Actions ............................................. 547 
II.BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE II AND ITS SEVEN SISTERS ................................ 548 
A. The Road to Business Roundtable II ....................................... 548 
1. Business Roundtable I ........................................................ 549 
2. Teicher v. SEC ................................................................... 550 
3. Chamber of Commerce I .................................................... 551 
4. Chamber of Commerce II .................................................. 552 
5. Goldstein v. SEC ................................................................ 552 
6. Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC ...................................... 553 
7. American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC ... 553 
B. The SEC’s Latest and Biggest Defeat in the D.C. Circuit ....... 554 
III.THE IMPLICATIONS OF HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY .................... 557 
IV.TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO OR SEEK ALTERNATIVES? ................ 562 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 564 
 
 
  J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2013; A.B. Government, 
Harvard University, 2004.  The author would like to thank Professors William W. Bratton 
and Jill E. Fisch for their invaluable guidance and advice.  The author would also like to 
thank the editorial team of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for its 
helpful editing and feedback.  Finally, special thanks to my family for the constant support 
throughout the process. 
AL ALAMI - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  1:21 PM 
542 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was born out of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
1
 (1934 Act) in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression as a means for regulating the stock market, enhancing 
transparency and corporate information-sharing and, ultimately, protecting 
investors.  Armed with Congress’ grant of rulemaking and enforcement 
authority, the SEC, since its inception, has promulgated rules aimed at 
realizing the SEC’s mandate.  But securities regulation by the SEC did not 
come about unopposed.  Indeed, since as early as 1936, interest parties 
have challenged a number of the SEC’s promulgated rules.
2
  This Comment 
will explore the recent history of judicial challenge to SEC rulemaking, 
specifically in the area of securities regulation.  Through an examination of 
the eight cases since 1990, where the D.C. Circuit invalidated an SEC-
promulgated rule in the area of securities regulation, this Comment argues 
that the D.C. Circuit’s most recent ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC
3
 
(Business Roundtable II) represents a turning point indicative of an 
unprecedented level of heightened judicial scrutiny of securities regulation.  
Such heightened scrutiny, epitomized by Business Roundtable II’s elevated 
demands—and, in effect, substantive review—of the SEC’s cost-benefit 
analysis, poses a real threat to future attempts at securities regulation, as 
well as SEC rulemaking abilities more generally.
4
 
 
 1.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). 
 2.  See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (challenging the SEC’s ability to prevent a 
party’s withdrawal of a registration statement in the face of an SEC proceeding challenging 
the truth and sufficiency of that statement); see also E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. 
Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities 
and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571 (2004) (examining every U.S. Supreme Court decision 
on a securities issue between 1933 and 2004). 
 3.  647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 4.  During the final editorial work on this Comment, the Columbia Business Law 
Review published Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of 
Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 746 (2012).  While there is some overlap, Mr. Mongone’s Note and this Comment are 
different because they each examine Business Roundtable II through a different lens.  Most 
notably, Mr. Mongone analyzes the court’s holding by looking at the legislative history of 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and the standard of judicial 
review contemplated by the Act.  This Comment, conversely, approaches Business 
Roundtable II through an examination of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in prior cases 
concerning SEC rules and regulations.  Separately, James D. Cox and Benjamin J.C. 
Baucom argue in The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation 
of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2012) (also published during the 
final editorial work on this Comment), that “the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit 
in Business Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the 
standard enacted by Congress.”  Though similar, my Comment and the Cox and Baucom 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Setting the Stage:  From New York to Washington, D.C. 
In July of 2011, only eleven days before the D.C. Circuit issued its 
opinion in Business Roundtable II, Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of 
New York held that Rajat Gupta, a corporate executive tied to the insider-
trading scheme the SEC was investigating at Raj Rajaratnam’s Galleon 
Group, may bring a lawsuit against the SEC alleging that the SEC, in its 
investigation, had violated Gupta’s rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause.
5
  In so deciding, Judge Rakoff served the SEC a number of strong 
blows, from questioning the SEC’s motives when it filed an administrative 
proceeding against Gupta,
6
 to all but accusing the SEC of arbitrarily 
discriminating against identical defendants.
7
 
Just a few months after that opinion, Judge Rakoff struck once again 
in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., where he departed, though not 
unprecedentedly,
8
 from the trend of courts accepting settlements that the 
SEC reaches with other parties.
9
  The SEC and Citigroup had reached the 
 
articles are different, because the latter compares the D.C. Circuit’s standard of review in 
Business Roundtable II and its predecessors with that prescribed by Congress.  This 
Comment, however, compares the court’s approach in Business Roundtable II with the 
approach in that case’s predecessors.  The Journal of Corporation Law also published Grant 
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable 
v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101 (2012).  In that piece, the authors focus on the issue of 
shareholder voting rights and discuss how Business Roundtable II is part of a “growing 
preference amongst some law and economics commentators for a Potemkin-Village version 
of shareholder democracy . . . .”  Id. at 102.  By contrast, this Comment examines the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach to all SEC rulemaking, not just rules related to proxy access.  Finally, in 
Rachel A. Benedict, Note, Judicial Review of SEC Rules: Managing the Costs of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 97 MINN. L. REV. 278 (2012), the author reviews a trilogy of cases that 
includes Business Roundtable II, id. at 284, and advocates the need for a more clearly 
defined scope of SEC cost-benefit analysis.  Id. at 279.  This Comment takes a different 
approach in that it provides a comprehensive historical case law analysis of judicial review 
of SEC rulemaking since the first Business Roundtable case in 1990.  This Comment is also 
different in that it sees Business Roundtable II as a turning point in judicial review of SEC 
rulemaking, and thus discusses this latest case’s significance and consequences for federal 
securities law generally. 
 5.  Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 6.  See id. at 506 (describing the SEC’s move as a “seeming exercise in forum-
shopping”). 
 7.  See id. at 514 (“[W]e have the unusual case where there is already a well-
developed public record of Gupta being treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially 
identical defendants, with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant papers, as to 
why this should be so.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 9.  827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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settlement at issue in the form of a consent judgment.
10
  In this case, as had 
been practiced by the SEC and regulated parties before, the consent 
judgment required Citigroup to pay a penalty, but allowed it to refrain from 
making any admissions as to the charges.
11
  When first faced with the SEC-
Citigroup consent judgment, Judge Rakoff put some questions to the 
parties, asking, as the basis of his questions, how the settlement would 
provide any substantive relief to harmed parties.
12
  Ultimately, the court 
refused to approve the proposed settlement, because, Judge Rakoff wrote, it 
“has not been provided with any proven or admitted facts upon which to 
exercise even a modest degree of independent judgment.”
13
  In refusing to 
rubberstamp the consent judgment, Judge Rakoff further wrote that “[a]n 
application of judicial power that does not rest on facts is worse than 
mindless, it is inherently dangerous”
14
 and concluded that a consent 
judgment such as the one presented “serves no lawful or moral purpose and 
is simply an engine of oppression.”
15
 
A number of commentators have viewed such opinions from the 
Southern District of New York as a sign of rising hostility towards the 
SEC.  For example, Michael McConnell, a former judge on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, called the Citigroup opinion “startling to 
say the least.”
16
  He continued:  “Judge Rakoff has effectively taken on the 
role of a prosecutor, second-guessing the SEC’s law enforcement 
decisions” and ultimately, he projected, leading to impossibly costly 
litigation that would prevent the SEC from pursuing many enforcement 
actions.
17
  On the other hand, some see the circuit court’s opinions as less 
of a criticism of the SEC and more an expression of concern with holding 
Wall Street and financial institutions accountable.
18
  This view prompts the 
 
 10.  Id. at 330. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 335. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Joe Palazzolo, Law Blog Expert Panel: Ex-Judges on Rakoff’s Citi Ruling, LAW 
BLOG (Dec. 19, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/19/law-blog-expert-
panel-ex-judges-on-rakoffs-citi-ruling/. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See e.g., Reynolds Holding, Courts More Willing to Second-Guess Wall Street, 
BREAKINGVIEWS (Dec. 05, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2011/12/05/courts 
-more-willing-to-second-guess-wall-street/ (“[Judge Rakoff’s] opinion showed little fear of 
creating market uncertainty, arguing that the public interest is better served by holding 
companies’ feet to the fire than by quietly settling disputes without any admission of 
wrongdoing.”); Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, Judge Rakoff Challenge to the 
S.E.C.: Can Regulatory Capture be Reversed?, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 02, 2011), http://ww 
w.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1202_rakoff_challenge_kaufmann.aspx (“The judge’s 
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question:  Is it within the courts’ purview to seek accountability from 
private institutions? 
The Second Circuit has since granted a stay to Judge Rakoff’s ruling 
in Citigroup.
19
  In its decision, the Second Circuit criticized Judge Rakoff’s 
view that the SEC-Citigroup settlement was not in the public interest.  “It is 
not . . . the proper function of federal courts to dictate policy to executive 
administrative agencies,” read the opinion.
20
  “[F]ederal judges—who have 
no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by 
those who do.  The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy 
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public 
interest are not judicial ones . . . . ”
21
 
Irrespective of the Second Circuit’s stay in Citigroup, the New York 
court’s opinions give pause for thought as to whether we are at a new 
junction in the relationship between the SEC and the judiciary.  To explore 
the existence and extent of such a phenomenon, this Comment will look to 
the very center of judicial review of the SEC—the D.C. Circuit and its line 
of opinions on SEC securities regulation 
B. Judicial Review of Agency Rules 
Over the years, and as the SEC, along with other agencies, was 
challenged in the courts, a number of administrative law doctrines were 
developed to demarcate the limits of judicial review of agency rules and 
orders.  Most relevantly, agency action became entitled to greater judicial 
deference after Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 
Inc.
22
  Under what became known as “Chevron deference,” a court reviews 
an agency’s construction of a statute with a two-step test.
23
  First, the court 
asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”
24
  If Congressional intent is clear, the court’s inquiry ends.  If, 
however, the court finds the intent of Congress ambiguous, or if the statute 
is silent with respect to the issue, “the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
25
 
 
ruling brings to light, once more, the extent to which the regulatory agency may have been 
subject to capture and undue influence by financial institutions, while also potentially 
challenging the status quo.”). 
 19.  U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 20.  Id. at 163. 
 21.  Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
866 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 23.  Id. at 842-43. 
 24.  Id. at 842. 
 25.  Id. at 843. 
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A second enhancement to judicial review of agency decisions and 
rules was the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which 
requires, among other things, that a court set aside agency actions it finds 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”
26
  In determining whether an agency action is 
arbitrary or capricious, a court must ensure that the agency in question has 
“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation 
for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made.’”
27
  Unlike Chevron, the APA and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of it in State Farm, demonstrate heightened judicial scrutiny 
for agency actions.  Indeed, the APA’s instruction became known as the 
“hard look doctrine,” because it requires courts to more closely examine 
information the agency provides in its reasoning.
28
  Enacted in 1966, the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard was viewed as a response to the 
“pervasive distrust of administrative agencies and the growth of public 
interest regulation.”
29
  By virtue of the nature of lawsuits brought to them, 
the judges of the D.C. Circuit played a key role in the development of 
“arbitrary and capricious” review of agency decisions, unanimously 
agreeing that the court should not “continue the deference that 
characterized judicial review of administrative agency action during the 
1940s and 1950s.”
30
  The standard of review has been wielded by the D.C. 
Circuit to invalidate countless agency actions over the decades, including 
the SEC’s Rule 14a-11 in Business Roundtable II.  Indeed, “courts continue 
to develop administrative common law doctrines and to employ those 
already in their doctrinal arsenal . . . with regularity and vigor.”
31
 
Congress has also enacted the National Securities Market 
Improvement Act of 1996 to amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(ICA) to require the SEC in its rulemaking to consider:  (1) “whether an 
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,” (2) “the protection 
of investors,” and, (3) “whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”
32
  The Act thus in a way complements 
“arbitrary and capricious” review by specifying what the SEC in particular 
 
 26.  Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 27.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 28.  See Matthew Warren, Note, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the 
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002). 
 29.  Id. at 2599. 
 30.  Id. at 2600. 
 31.  Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293, 1320 (2012). 
 32.  National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(b) (2000). 
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must consider so that its actions are not found to have violated the APA’s 
hard look doctrine. 
Most recently, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 
13563,
33
 “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” requiring 
administrative agencies to:  (1) run a cost-benefit analysis of its proposed 
rules, (2) tailor its regulations such that society is least burdened, (3) select 
approaches that maximize net benefits, (4) specify performance objectives, 
and (5) consider alternatives to direct regulations.
34
  The order further 
requires all agencies to use the “best available techniques to quantify 
anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as 
possible.”
35
  Because the SEC is an independent regulatory commission and 
not an executive agency, Executive Order 13563 technically does not apply 
to the SEC’s rulemaking.
36
  The order was thus extended to explicitly apply 
to independent regulatory agencies through Executive Order 13,579,
37
 
“Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies.”  The latter order 
underscores that “[i]ndependent regulatory agencies, no less than executive 
agencies, should promote that goal [outlined in Executive Order 13,563].”
38
 
C. Judicial Review of SEC Actions 
It is against this administrative law backdrop and the still-evolving balance 
between agency rulemaking authority and judicial review that the securities 
regulations of the SEC have been challenged in courts.  Over more than 
two decades, since 1990, the SEC has had to (unsuccessfully) defend eight 
securities-related regulations in the D.C. Circuit.
39
  This Comment will 
 
 33.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See Assessing Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis for Dodd-Frank Rules, SECURITIES 
LAW DAILY, Apr. 30, 2012, available at 2012 WL 1452277 (explaining that although 
Executive Orders like this one technically do not apply to the SEC because it is an 
independent regulatory commission and not an executive branch agency, agencies have 
traditionally followed the spirit of executive orders). 
 37.  Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  The eight cases are:  Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(challenging SEC rule on proxy access and shareholder-nominated candidates); Am. Equity 
Life Ins. Co. v. U.S. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (challenging SEC regulation of 
fixed income annuities); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. U.S. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(challenging exemption of broker-dealers from the Investment Advisers Act); Goldstein v. 
U.S. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging SEC rule on hedge fund exemptions); 
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging 
same upon remand); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (challenging SEC regulation of mutual funds); Teicher v. U.S. SEC, 177 F.3d 1016 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (challenging SEC limitations on persons who commit certain offenses 
AL ALAMI - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  1:21 PM 
548 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
examine each of these cases and argue that, while the D.C. Circuit vacated 
the rule at issue in each instance, the most recent of the cases, Business 
Roundtable II, represents a turning point in judicial review of the SEC’s 
actions.  Unlike in preceding cases, the D.C. Circuit in Business 
Roundtable II conducted an unusually aggressive examination of the 
factual record the SEC presented in support of its rule.
40
  Indeed, especially 
viewed in tandem with recent court actions in New York, Business 
Roundtable II amounts to the D.C. Circuit’s “strongest admonition of the 
SEC to date”
41
 and may hint at general rising distrust, or even hostility, by 
the federal courts towards the SEC.  The court’s analysis in Business 
Roundtable II also raises serious questions about the SEC’s rulemaking 
power in the area of securities regulation, as it sets an unprecedentedly high 
bar for the SEC to meet before it promulgates a new rule. 
This Comment will explore the recent history of the adjudication of 
securities regulation, bookended by the two Business Roundtable cases, and 
the possible implications of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in the 2011 case.  Part 
II of this Comment looks at Business Roundtable II, its precedents, and 
how the two differ.  In Part III, I examine the significance of the 
phenomenon of heightened judicial scrutiny of SEC actions and its 
potential repercussions.  Finally, Part IV briefly addresses any alternatives 
that exist to the looming status quo. 
What we see today could signal the onset of a new era in the 
relationship between federal courts and the SEC.  It is important to be 
aware of these undercurrents of change, signaling rising distrust of SEC 
rulemaking.  It is equally important to consider what the consequences of 
such a change, if realized, would be, so that the strides made in securities 
regulation since the 1934 Act are not undermined. 
II. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE II AND ITS SEVEN SISTERS 
A. The Road to Business Roundtable II 
The SEC has no doubt had a tumultuous relationship with the D.C. 
Circuit and the Supreme Court.  While judicial analyses of SEC action have 
ranged between “expansive” and “restrictive,”
42
 in the few years before 
 
related to investment advising); Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (challenging rule regarding corporate listings on national security exchanges). 
 40.  Business Roundtable II, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 41.  Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share 
Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2012). 
 42.  See Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 2 (examining every U.S. Supreme Court 
decision on a securities issue between 1933 and 2004 and categorizing each as exhibiting 
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1990, the SEC was experiencing a period of relatively low judicial 
resistance—the SEC “often prevailed in the lower courts and saw the 
Supreme Court deny numerous petitions for certiorari.”
43
  These few years 
of deference to the SEC came to an abrupt end with the D.C. Circuit’s 1990 
ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC (Business Roundtable I),
44
 striking an 
SEC rule pertaining to self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), thus 
marking “increasing hostility towards SEC regulations not specifically 
grounded in statutory text”
45
 and “presag[ing] the current attitude towards 
SEC rulemaking.”
46
 
In the twenty-one years bookended by the D.C. Circuit’s decisions 
in Business Roundtable I and Business Roundtable II, the SEC defended 
securities-related rules against challenges seven times in the same court.  It 
lost every time. 
1. Business Roundtable I 
In Business Roundtable I, analyzing the issue under Chevron 
deference, the D.C. Circuit found “in excess of the Commission’s 
authority”
47
 its Rule 19c-4, which barred SROs from listing the stock of “a 
corporation that takes any corporate action with the effect of nullifying, 
restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of [existing 
common stockholders].”
48
  Declaring that Rule 19c-4 “directly interferes 
with the substance of what the shareholders may enact,”
49
 the court 
reasoned that it was impermissible for the SEC to promulgate a rule that 
“directly controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of 
shareholders,”
50
 which is normally in the purview of state corporate law.
51
  
The court examined the SEC’s claim that it could promulgate such a rule 
 
either an “expansive” or “restrictive” reading of the statutes granting the SEC rulemaking 
authority). 
 43.  Chasing the Devil Around the Stump: Securities Regulation, the SEC and the 
Courts, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.sechistoric 
al.org/museum/galleries/ctd/ctd_05a_era_caution_adjusts.php (citing Sullivan & Thompson, 
supra note 2). 
 44.  905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 45.  Jodie A. Kirshner, What Rough Beast . . . Slouches Towards Bethlehem: Business 
Roundtable v. SEC and the SEC’s Delegated Rulemaking Authority, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 497, 513 (2006). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  905 F.2d at 407.  “SEC” and the “Commission” are used interchangeably. 
 48.  Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 49.  Id. at 411. 
 50.  Id. at 407. 
 51.  Id. at 412. 
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because it falls under its mandate of protecting public interest.
52
  To this, 
the court plainly said, “‘public interest’ is never an unbounded term.”
53
  
Finally, the court held that it was not the intent of Congress for the SEC to 
regulate corporate governance.
54
 
In sum, the court looked at the SEC’s interpretation of congressional 
intent through the lens of Chevron, deemed that Rule 19c-4 regulated 
substance whereas Congress had only meant for the SEC to regulate 
procedure, and held the rule invalid.  For nine years thereafter, Business 
Roundtable I was the D.C. Circuit’s final and clearest word on what the 
SEC can and cannot regulate, marking a clear departure from how the SEC 
had fared in lower courts in previous years.
55
 
2. Teicher v. SEC56 
The Teicher rule challenge originally stemmed from the SEC’s action 
against two individuals who had been criminally convicted for participation 
in an insider-trading scheme.
57
  Upon being barred from participating from 
various branches of the securities industry, the two challenged the SEC’s 
interpretation of section 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act, which allowed the SEC 
to “place limitations on the activities or functions of [such convicted 
persons] . . . .”
58
  Applying Chevron, the court held that the SEC’s 
interpretation that the section allows it to bar convicted persons’ 
participation in any securities industry it controls was unreasonable and 
contrary to the intent of Congress.
59
  Once again, the opinion looked solely 
at the SEC interpretation of a statute and compared it with context and 
congressional intent. 
 
 52.  Id. at 413. 
 53.  Id. at 413. 
 54.  Id. at 417. 
 55.  Chasing the Devil Around the Stump: Securities Regulation, the SEC and the 
Courts, VIRTUAL MUSEUM AND ARCHIVE OF THE HISTORY OF SECURITIES REGULATION (Feb. 
23, 2012), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/ctd/; see also Kirshner, supra note 
45, at 513 (contending that “the Business Roundtable [I] holding appears more likely today 
than it did fourteen years ago when the case was decided”). 
 56.  177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 57.  Id. at 1017. 
 58.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(6), 104 Stat. 931, 952-53 (1990) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A) (2006)). 
 59.  Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1021. 
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3. Chamber of Commerce I60 
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC (“Chamber of 
Commerce I”), the D.C. Circuit invalidated an SEC rule that required 
mutual funds to have no less than seventy-five percent independent 
directors and an independent chairman.
61
  While the court found that the 
SEC had authority to promulgate the rule under the ICA and that the rule 
was not arbitrary or capricious under the APA, it faulted the SEC for its 
failure under the ICA to consider the impact of the rule on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.
62
  Recognizing the difficulty of running 
reliable empirical studies, the D.C. Circuit wrote that “uncertainty may 
limit what the Commission can do, but it does not excuse the Commission 
from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise itself—and hence 
the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed 
regulation . . . .”
63
  In addition, the SEC, in explaining why it had adopted 
the rule, did not address an alternative to the rule put forward during the 
notice and comment period and raised by two dissenting Commissioners.
64
  
The court found that this was equally fatal to the rule’s promulgation, 
because while the “Commission is not required to consider ‘every 
alternative . . . conceivable by the mind of man . . .[,]’”
65
 that particular 
alternative was “neither frivolous nor out of bounds and the SEC therefore 
had an obligation to consider it.”
66
  While the court did not require that the 
SEC always conduct an empirical study (the “decision not to do an 
empirical study does not make that an unreasoned decision”
67
), the case 
provided guidance on the process of SEC rulemaking by suggesting that 
the SEC “would be well served to [conduct empirical studies] when facts 
are available”
68
 and to “set out a vague standard for when agency decisions 
must be based on empirical data and provide[] open-ended guidelines for 
future determinations regarding when it is appropriate for agencies to 
engage in rulemaking without considering empirical studies.”
69
 
 
 60.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 144. 
 63.  Id. at 144. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 51 (1983). 
 66.  Id. at 145. 
 67.  Id. at 142. 
 68.  David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs After 
the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 51 (2005). 
 69.  Brett Friedman et al., Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 619, 656 
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4. Chamber of Commerce II70 
In Chamber of Commerce I, the D.C. Circuit remanded the rule to 
the SEC “to address the deficiencies.”
71
  On remand, the SEC re-adopted 
the same conditions invalidated in Chamber of Commerce I, adding some 
empirical data to bolster its decision.  The Chamber of Commerce once 
again challenged the rule, and the D.C. Circuit once again held that the 
SEC’s process was flawed because the SEC “failed to comply with section 
553(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C § 553(c), by relying on materials not in the 
rulemaking record without affording an opportunity for public comment, to 
the prejudice of the Chamber.”
72
  Here, the court held, “[t]he Commission’s 
extensive reliance upon extra-record materials in arriving at its cost 
estimates, and thus in determining not to modify the two conditions [at 
issue in Chamber of Commerce I], however, required further opportunity 
for comment . . . ”
73
—a procedural step that the SEC was deemed to have 
failed to follow.  In other words, the rule once again failed on a relatively 
trivial process ground. 
5. Goldstein v. SEC74 
At issue here was the SEC’s rule requiring that hedge fund investors 
be counted as fund clients for purposes of an exemption that excused 
investment advisers with fewer than fifteen clients from registering under 
the Investment Advisers Act (IAA).
75
  The SEC once again failed to defend 
the rule, as the D.C. Circuit invalidated it for conflicting with statutory 
purpose.
76
  Analyzing the case through Chevron, the court wrote that 
although no official definition existed for “client,” “[t]he lack of a statutory 
definition of a word does not necessarily render the meaning of a word 
ambiguous.”
77
  The court also highlighted that the definition the 
Commission now sought to apply inexplicably diverged from the SEC’s 
own prior definition, rendering it “completely arbitrary.”
78
  And finally, 
because the new rule/definition “create[d] a situation in which funds with 
one hundred or fewer investors are exempt from the more demanding 
 
(2006). 
 70.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 71.  412 F.3d at 145. 
 72.  443 F.3d at 894. 
 73.  Id. at 901. 
 74.  Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 75.  Id. at 874. 
 76.  Id. at 884. 
 77.  Id. at 878. 
 78.  Id. at 883. 
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Investment Company Act, but those with fifteen or more investors trigger 
registration under the Advisers Act,” the court held that the rule was 
arbitrary.
79
  Here again, the court found that the SEC statutory 
interpretation was impermissible through “narrow”
80
 reasoning pertaining 
to interpretation and process. 
6. Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC81 
In this case, the SEC had attempted to exempt broker-dealers from the 
requirements of the IAA when they receive special compensation for their 
services.
82
  The court found that the first step of Chevron had been satisfied 
such that the IAA was not ambiguous as to the definition of “investment 
adviser.”
83
  Consequently, the SEC’s rule exceeded its authority and the 
SEC was held to lack the power to craft new exemptions under the Act.
84
 
7. American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC85 
 The final precedent to Business Roundtable II provides some 
foreshadowing for what the court would eventually do in Business 
Roundtable II.  The SEC rule at issue here classified fixed indexed 
annuities (FIAs) offered by insurance companies as non-annuity contracts, 
thus requiring that they be subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 
1933.
86
  While the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC’s classification of FIAs 
was not unreasonable under Chevron,
87
 it still found that the SEC had 
“failed to consider the efficiency, competition, and capital formation effects 
of the new [r]ule” and invalidated the rule under the APA.
88
  In its analysis, 
the court criticized the SEC's claim that the rule would enhance 
competition because of the ambiguity that the absence of a rule on the 
 
 79.  Id. at 884. 
 80.  Dustin G. Hall, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our 
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 187 (2008). 
 81.  482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 82.  Id. at 483. 
 83.  The IAA carved out six exemptions from its broad definition in § 202(a)(11), 
including “(C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental 
to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special 
compensation therefor.”  15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).  The text of the act also read that 
“(H) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may 
designate by rules and regulations or order.”  15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).   
 84.  Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 492. 
 85.  Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. U.S. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 86.  Id. at 167. 
 87.  Id. at 174. 
 88.  Id. at 176. 
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matter had created.  “The SEC cannot justify the adoption of a particular 
rule based solely on the assertion that the existence of a rule provides 
greater clarity to an area that remained unclear in the absence of any 
rule.”
89
  Rather, the court said, the APA requires “an analysis of whether 
the specific rule will promote efficiency, competition and capital 
formation.”
90
  From there, the court held insufficient the SEC’s entire cost-
benefit analysis, as it was largely based on the weak foundation of the “rule 
clarity” rationale, and the SEC had failed to provide empirical data to 
support its presumptions.
91
 
In the nineteen years between 1990 and 2009, the D.C. Circuit 
invalidated all seven SEC securities regulations challenged in the court.
92
  
The grounds for invalidation varied between faulty statutory interpretation 
or lack of authority under Chevron and failure to meet the demands of the 
ICA and the APA.
93
  With this line of holdings, and especially the court’s 
reasoning in Chamber of Commerce I and American Equity Life Insurance, 
the SEC had been warned that empirical studies will often be required of it, 
and that such studies will have to be rule-specific.  In no case, however, did 
the court engage in aggressive substantive review of the SEC’s empirical 
rationale behind its rulemaking. 
B. The SEC’s Latest and Biggest Defeat in the D.C. Circuit 
In Business Roundtable II, the D.C. Circuit overturned a proxy access 
rule promulgated by the SEC, Rule 14a-11, aimed at allowing shareholders 
to more easily and cheaply nominate non-incumbent candidates for 
corporate boards.  Had it been upheld, Rule 14a-11 would have “require[d] 
a company subject to the [1934] Act proxy rules . . . to include in its proxy 
materials ‘the name of a person or persons nominated by a [qualifying] 
shareholder or group of shareholders for election to the board of 
directors.’”
94
  In invalidating the rule, the court held that the SEC had 
“acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed . . . adequately to assess 
the economic effects of a new rule.”
95
  Stating the rationale plainly, Judge 
Ginsburg, writing for the court, wrote that the SEC “inconsistently and 
opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed 
 
 89.  Id. at 177-78. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 179. 
 92.  See cases cited supra note 39. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 647 F.3d at 1147 (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,682-83, 56,782-83). 
 95.  Id. at 1148. 
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adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could 
not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments; 
contradicted itself; and failed to respond to the substantial problems raised 
by commenters.”
96
 
The court’s approach in Business Roundtable II departs from that in 
the case’s precedents in a number of ways.  First, in terms of standard of 
review, whereas the SEC had been entitled to Chevron deference in some 
of the prior cases, Chevron had no place in Business Roundtable II, because 
there was no issue of statutory interpretation or ambiguity.  At its outset, 
therefore, the court’s reasoning rested solely on the strict requirements of 
the ICA and the APA, without the SEC being owed any deference in its 
rulemaking. 
Second, the court here showed no recognition for the difficulties an 
agency might face in developing its cost-benefit analysis and predicting 
future trends.  In Chamber of Commerce I, for example, the court exhibited 
acute awareness “that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every 
action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an 
agency may be ‘entitled to conduct . . . a general analysis based on 
informed conjecture.’”
97
  In Business Roundtable II on the other hand, 
without considering whether this instance would be one where an agency 
could base its decision on “informed conjecture,” the court found that “the 
Commission’s prediction directors might choose not to oppose shareholder 
nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation.”
98
 
 Third, unlike in prior cases, the D.C. Circuit here conducted a 
substantive assessment of the numbers and data the SEC relied on or 
forewent relying on.  For example, assessing the SEC’s argument that Rule 
14a-11 would improve board performance and increase shareholder value, 
the court strongly criticized the SEC for “rel[ying] exclusively and heavily 
upon two relatively unpersuasive studies, one concerning the effect of 
‘hybrid boards’ (which include some dissident directors) and the other 
concerning the effect of proxy contests in general, upon shareholder 
value.”
99
  The court found it insufficient that the SEC had discounted those 
studies “because of questions raised by subsequent studies, limitations 
acknowledged by the studies’ authors, or [the Commission’s] own concerns 
about the studies’ methodology or scope.”
100
  It is unclear why the court 
found the studies the SEC did rely on “relatively unpersuasive,” or why the 
 
 96.  Id. at 1148-49. 
 97.  Chamber of Commerce I, 412 F.3d at 142 (quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 
1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 98.  Business Roundtable II, 647 F.3d at 1150. 
 99.  Id. at 1151 (emphasis added). 
 100.  Id. 
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court found itself, in contrast to other securities-related cases, in a position 
to assess the soundness of methodology and empirical data regarding a 
promulgated SEC rule.
101
  Rather, the court “simply chose the opposite side 
of a politically charged debate.”
102
  The court’s intervention here thus 
differs widely from its approach in the two other cases where the SEC’s 
cost-benefit analysis was found insufficient.  In finding that the SEC had 
failed to meet its statutory obligation to assess the economic consequences 
of a proposed regulation in Chamber of Commerce I, the court did not go 
so far as to evaluate the substance of the different studies the SEC had 
considered.  Rather, acknowledging that the SEC would be “excused for 
failing to consider [an] alternative if it were, for whatever reason, unworthy 
of consideration,”
103
 the court merely found that the alternative not assessed 
by the SEC was neither frivolous nor out of bounds and thus required 
inclusion in the SEC’s weighting.
104
  In American Equity, where the court 
held arbitrary and capricious the SEC’s consideration of efficiency, 
competition, and capital-formation implications, the court here, too, did not 
assess the soundness of empirical data.
105
  Rather, it faulted the SEC for 
having based its entire reasoning on the shaky assumption that the 
existence of a rule—any rule—would have positive repercussions in the 
three areas requiring analysis under the APA.
106
  In contrast, the SEC 
submitted to the D.C. Circuit a brief of over sixty pages and thorough 
explanations for its promulgation of Rule 14a-11 in preparation for 
litigation in Business Roundtable II.
107
  Furthermore, the court in Business 
Roundtable II wrote that the agency “failed to make tough choices about 
which of the competing estimates is most plausible, [or] to hazard a guess 
as to which is correct.”
108
  Query whether the D.C. Circuit, under the bar it 
had just set for the SEC, would have found acceptable or adequate 
reasoning based on a hazarded guess. 
Finally and relatedly, whereas the court’s objections to SEC action in 
many of Business Roundtable II’s precedents can be attributed to the SEC’s 
failure to follow required procedure, it is arguably impossible to do the 
same in the 2011 decision.  In Business Roundtable I, the court applied 
Chevron to reject the SEC’s statutory interpretation that it may take action 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for 
Inadequate Economic Analysis, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1094 (2012). 
 103.  412 F.3d at 144. 
 104.  Id. at 145. 
 105.  613 F.3d at 179. 
 106.  Id. at 177-79. 
 107.  Brief for Respondent, Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014799. 
 108.  647 F.3d at 1150 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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on issues of substantive corporate governance; action in the area of 
substantive corporate governance is reserved for the states, the court 
reasoned.
109
  In Teicher, Goldstein, and Financial Planning Association, the 
issue was a matter of statutory interpretation and the court never in these 
decisions invalidated the SEC rule based on the SEC’s cost-benefit 
analysis.
110
  In Chamber of Commerce I, as discussed above, the rule at 
issue was remanded to the SEC because the SEC failed to utilize any 
empirical studies per the demands of the ICA and had failed entirely to 
consider alternatives, not because the court deemed those alternatives more 
persuasive than the empirical evidence presented by the SEC.
111
  In 
Chamber of Commerce II, the basis of the court’s ruling was purely 
procedural, given the SEC’s failure to subject new evidence to notice and 
comment.
112
  Finally, in American Equity Life Insurance, the court rejected 
the SEC rule because the SEC provided a weak rationale as to how its new 
rule improves efficiency, competition and capital formation (“any rule is 
better than no rule.”).  The SEC’s reasoning was nowhere as thorough as it 
was in its adoption of Rule 14a-11. 
Lastly, it is also important to note the context of Business Roundtable 
II.  The SEC promulgated Rule 14a-11 after the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Consumer Protection Act and its express grant of authority to the 
SEC to adopt proxy access rules.
113
  This context further highlights the D.C. 
Circuit’s aggressive approach to reviewing the SEC’s rulemaking. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
The new attitudes exhibited by the D.C. Circuit, for the time being, 
and especially if the attitudes self-realize into a long-term trend, will not be 
without repercussions for the general field of corporate governance.  
Business Roundtable II leaves open the question of just how much 
empirical evidence the D.C. Circuit would require to accept SEC action on 
corporate governance as adequately reasoned.  In the area of shareholder 
voting alone, opinions abound as to whether increasing proxy access is 
 
 109.  Business Roundtable I, 905 F.2d 406, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 110.  Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 483; Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874; Teicher, 177 
F.3d at 1017. 
 111.  Chamber of Commerce I, 412 F.3d at 145. 
 112.  Chamber of Commerce II, 443 F.3d at 909. 
 113.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 103 Stat. 440 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 
19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49, and 112 U.S.C.).  The Act was effective in 
July 2010.  Rule 14a-11 was to be effective in November 2010.  Shareholder Nominations, 
75 Fed. Reg. 56,782 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-11), invalidated by Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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desirable for the market and, by extension, increases shareholder value.  
For example, in an extensive event analysis, Ali C. Akyol concluded that 
proxy access diminishes shareholder value.
114
  In contrast, Bo Becker, also 
employing event analysis, concluded that “financial markets placed a 
positive value on shareholders access” and, by extension, proxy access 
maximizes shareholder value.
115
  Had the SEC presented one of these 
studies over the other, would the court have accepted that?  It is indeed 
questionable whether it is for the courts, based on the judiciary’s generally 
limited expertise in such specialized areas, to assess the substance of these 
studies and approve just one as a satisfactory basis for regulatory action. 
It is true that some judges are particularly learned and experienced in 
securities regulation, with a sophisticated understanding of the field.  
However, given the doctrine of stare decisis, as well as the judicial tradition 
of courts and judges borrowing from each other across circuit lines, one 
judge’s successful heightened scrutiny in a single instance or action is only 
in a limited way, if at all, generally acceptable for all judges and courts.
116
 
Even if one deems judges sufficiently well-prepared to so incisively 
scrutinize the substance of empirical evidence selected by the SEC as a 
check on SEC balance and impartiality, it is difficult to argue that judges 
themselves are any more immune to political and other external influences 
in their decision-making.  For example, Delaware judges take into 
consideration the state’s supremacy in charter competition and in setting 
national corporate law standards, actively attempt to balance their opinions 
with the interests of the state.
117
 
Furthermore, while courts are generally deferential to agencies’ 
statutory interpretations and other rulemaking under Chevron, the recent 
decisions related to statutory interpretation in the D.C. Circuit seem to 
dilute that deference—by setting ever-higher bars for meeting the 
requirements of the ICA and the standards of arbitrary and capricious 
review under the APA, the D.C. Circuit weakens the policy reasons 
 
 114.  Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s 
Rule to Facilitate Director Nominations, (Dept. of Fin., Univ. of Melbourne, Working 
Paper, June 7, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081. 
 115.  Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence 
from the Business Roundtable Challenge 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-052, 
2010), available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6581.html. 
 116.  See D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for 
Inadequate Economic Analysis, supra note 102, at 1092 (“Courts hardly outperform the 
SEC at evaluating the imperfect science of economics.  Judges can struggle with expert 
testimony in their own decisions, and traditional training leaves most jurists ill-prepared to 
engage with sophisticated econometrics.”). 
 117.  Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory 
Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1292 (2009). 
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underlying Chevron. 
Business Roundtable II, in particular, extends the boundaries of 
arbitrary and capricious review—an implication that must not go un- 
checked.  The holding raises serious questions about how the SEC or any 
other agency can succeed at a cost-benefit showing.  While cost-benefit 
analysis should ideally provide an objective, impartial basis for decision-
making, “[it] has become a powerful weapon in the hands of vocal 
opponents of regulation.”
118
  In their book on the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in health and environmental regulation, Frank Ackerman and Lisa 
Heinzerling discuss how cost and benefit calculations may be skewed.
119
  
For example, “there is a tendency to overestimate the cost of regulations in 
advance of their implementation.”
120
  In other words, while ideally 
objective, cost-benefit analysis is a highly manipulable tool—governments 
and businesses alike may influence its outcome based on the desired result.  
On the agency side, “officials are not pure technocrats, but political beings 
who routinely make decisions based not on their scientific merit, but as a 
result of ‘congressional pressure, interest group lobbying, bureaucratic (but 
non-expertise-based) policy views, or bureaucratic protection of turf or 
other self-interest.’”
121
  Pressures from other (non-scientific) sources and 
self-interest similarly lead businesses to take their own positions. 
The court in Business Roundtable II also seems to underestimate the 
difficulty of accurately predicting the impact of rules to make a truly 
falsifiable empirical cost-benefit case.  Especially in the field of financial 
and securities regulation, “key variables may be difficult to quantify”
122
 and 
too many externalities are possible.  In addition, no guidelines exist for 
what the D.C. Circuit will consider sound cost-benefit analysis.  If cost-
benefit analysis is to become a permanent and aggressively reviewed 
fixture in SEC rulemaking, the agency must be able to turn to a series of 
guidelines or standards such that its analysis is sound without being overly 
cumbersome.  The SEC would also have to add to its staff industry and 
economics experts for the sole reason of keeping up with the standards set 
 
 118.  FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35 (2004).  The authors criticize the use of cost-
benefit analysis in health and environmental regulation, but many of the points they make 
are relevant to financial regulation as well. 
 119.  Id. at 36. 
 120.  Id. at 37 (citing ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING 
SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 34 (1989)). 
 121.  Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from 
the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 54 (2006) 
(quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2278-90 
(2001)). 
 122.  Id. at 59. 
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in Business Roundtable II.
123
 
The D.C. Circuit has yet to hear another SEC case since Business 
Roundtable II, so it is unclear whether the court will attempt to limit the 
applicability of its holding.  Nonetheless, the courts have cited Business 
Roundtable II in a number of opinions examining rules and regulations by 
other agencies and departments.  On the one hand, there are signs that the 
D.C. Circuit may attempt to cabin the holding of Business Roundtable II to 
its facts—or perhaps just to the SEC.  For example, in American Petroleum 
Institute v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit attributed the outcome of Business 
Roundtable II to “the [SEC’s] larger failure to deal with the weight of the 
evidence against it.”
124
  Accordingly, the court stated that the American 
Petroleum Institute had “mistakenly place[d] much weight” on Business 
Roundtable II, because the EPA’s analysis related to a rule on a national 
ambient air quality standard for nitrogen dioxide “[is] materially better than 
the analysis” for which the SEC was faulted.
125
  In another opinion, the 
court distinguished Business Roundtable II from Ass’n of Private Sector 
Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, where the Association sued the 
Department and Secretary of Education under the APA for regulations 
promulgated under the Higher Education Act.
126
  The court highlighted that 
the Department of Education does not share the “unique [statutory] 
obligation” that the SEC has to consider the effect of a rule on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.
127
  The court set clear lines for itself 
when it put the onus on the regulation challenger to point to data or a study 
that an agency ignored.  The Association having failed to do so, the court 
wrote, renders “Business Roundtable . . . of no help to its argument.”
128
  
Most recently, in Investment Co. Institute v. U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, the D.C. Circuit upheld against challenge 
amendments that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
made to regulations regarding commodity pool operators.
129
  Distinguishing 
the CFTC’s decision-making process from that of the SEC in Business 
Roundtable II, the court wrote that: 
the CFTC not only considered what regulations were already in 
 
 123.  See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and 
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1686 (2012) (stating that a practical 
consequence of Business Roundtable II is “the need both for additional SEC staff with the 
requisite specialized expertise and a process of rulemaking that is more demonstrably 
interdisciplinary . . . .”). 
 124.  684 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 127.  Id. at 448 (quoting Business Roundtable II, 647 F.3d at 1148). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  No. 12-00612 (BAH), 2012 WL 6185735 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2012). 
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place but committed to streamlining the agency’s compliance 
requirements.  This shows that, unlike the SEC in Business 
Roundtable [II], the CFTC considered and evaluated whether 
other regulatory requirements “reduce the need for, and hence the 
benefit to be had from” registration and reporting requirements 
with the CFTC.
130
 
The court concluded:  “these cases are distinguishable.”
131
   
 On the other hand, in at least one instance, Business Roundtable II 
proved helpful to a district court in overturning an agency rule for failure to 
present a “satisfactory explanation for [the agency’s] action including a 
rational connection between the facts and the choice[s] made.”
132
  Further, 
the distinctly heightened level of judicial scrutiny in Business Roundtable 
II may have practical implications.  On the one hand, it may increase 
litigation as organizations like the Business Roundtable and the Chamber 
of Commerce are emboldened to challenge SEC regulations.  At the same 
time, however, the case exhibited such a high level of scrutiny that it may, 
at least temporarily, paralyze the SEC’s ability to promulgate new rules.
133
  
In essence, not only could litigation become unpredictable in the aftermath 
of Business Roundtable II, but the case is also “sufficiently threatening that 
an overworked and underfunded SEC may feel intimidated and 
compromise its rules, watering them down, to avoid the risk of another 
humiliating decision . . . .”
134
 
How the D.C. Circuit and other courts will interpret Business 
Roundtable II in future cases is thus unclear.  When it comes to SEC rules, 
however, the D.C. Circuit’s emphasis on cost-benefit analysis prompts the 
question:  How can the court decide which empirical case is more 
convincing without giving deference to one party over another, engaging in 
aggressive substantive review or, worse, simply exercising a substantive 
veto over regulations it does not like?
135
 
 
 130.  Id. at *50. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See, e.g., Berge v. United States, No. 10-0373, 2012 WL 3039736, at *34 (D.D.C. 
Jul. 26, 2012) (citing Business Roundtable II) (holding that the applied behavioral analysis 
aspect of the Department of Defense health system for the Armed Services was arbitrary and 
capricious). 
 133.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial 
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 
1066 (2012) (arguing that Business Roundtable II “cast[s] a substantial cloud over the 
SEC’s continuing ability to adopt other rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, even those 
not related to corporate governance”). 
 134.  Id. at 1067. 
 135.  See also J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist 
View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175, 194 
(2010) (“As 2010 unfolds, courts occasionally remind observers that the judiciary shall play 
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IV. TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO OR SEEK ALTERNATIVES? 
Business Roundtable II raises new challenges for the SEC in the area 
of securities regulation, and the agency will have to adapt to the heightened 
standards set forth in the D.C. Circuit decisions.  Short of the D.C. Circuit 
retracing a few of its own steps in Business Roundtable II, I see four 
possible alternatives that, separately or jointly, can help avoid paralysis in 
securities regulation and corporate governance more generally. 
 First, there is the possibility of private ordering in corporate 
governance and particularly on the issue of proxy access and the balance of 
power between shareholders and managers.  In an article commenting on 
proxy access and the fate in the D.C. Circuit of Rule 14a-11, Professor Jill 
Fisch argues that “federal regulation is poorly suited for regulating 
corporate governance,” whereas “[p]rivate ordering offers a more flexible 
mechanism” for doing so.
136
  Fisch outlines the many deficiencies in the 
SEC’s basis for Rule 14a-11 while criticizing the court’s oversight of these 
problems in favor of taking “the unprecedented approach of second-
guessing the conclusions of the SEC’s economic analysis.”
137
  Private 
ordering could help prevent such judicial moves while alleviating the 
“destructive ambiguity” of proxy access.
138
 
Conversely, and as a second alternative, Congress could enact 
legislation that explicitly states what the SEC will have to promulgate as a 
final rule on contentious governance and securities issues, such as proxy 
access.  Of course, this alternative is far from ideal because it undermines 
the SEC’s rulemaking authority and, more importantly, puts corporate 
governance in the hands of non-expert actors (members of Congress) who 
often yield to political pressures. 
Third, a sort of “rapprochement” between the D.C. Circuit and the 
SEC could be brokered if the former begins to recognize, and the latter 
begins to admit, the role of politics in rulemaking.
139
  This would entail the 
agency acknowledging instances where politics superseded empirical 
reasoning and courts viewing certain political influences as appropriate and 
legitimate.
140
  The benefits of such a relationship include de-politicizing 
science, softening the “ossification” charge increasingly directed at 
 
a role in the resolution of the economic crisis.”). 
 136.  Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 
435, 435 (2012). 
 137.  Id. at 439. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009). 
 140.  Id. 
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arbitrary and capricious review, and enabling greater political 
accountability by forcing disclosure of agencies’ political influences.
141
  
Under this scenario, the SEC may still have to analyze costs and benefits, 
but legitimate political influences in its decision-making would not prove 
automatically fatal to a rule. 
Fourth, the change could come from within the SEC, whereby the 
SEC would “reorient the reasoning supporting the proposed regulatory 
initiative”
142
 and would do so “as a lawyer, not as an econometrician or 
empiricist.”
143
  In other words, that the D.C. Circuit has struck each one of 
the challenged SEC rules since Business Roundtable I could be more about 
the approach and methodology of the SEC team defending the rule.  The 
SEC must recognize the key role that “[s]ophisticated number crunching” 
has come to play in the development of contemporary corporate law,
144
 and 
must strengthen its abilities accordingly.  It could also draw some lessons 
from the way other agencies go about conducting cost-benefit analyses to 
overcome judicial challenges to their rules and regulations.
145
 
Finally, if cost-benefit analysis is to be accepted as an essential tool in 
securities regulations and other SEC rulemaking, reform measures can be 
undertaken to prevent two evils:  that judges and courts substitute the 
SEC’s judgment for their own as a sort of substantive veto, and that the 
Commission “draft lengthy statements of basis and purpose filled with 
lengthy explanations and data that courts ultimately may, or may not, 
consider” adequate.
146
  Such reforms could include promulgating formal 
cost-benefit analysis guidelines for the SEC to follow in its rulemaking, 
creating a cost-sharing structure between the SEC, other financial 
regulators, and industry actors so that running the analysis would not 
become too costly for the SEC (a stick for the industry), and requiring ex 
post analyses of promulgated regulation in an effort to inform future 
empirical studies (a stick for the SEC).
147
  In addition, the SEC could be 
allowed to subject the cost-benefit analysis tool to a cost-benefit analysis to 
ascertain whether the tool is worthwhile in specific instances of 
rulemaking, thus “limit[ing] the use of [cost-benefit analysis] to those cases 
where the efficiency gains resulting from such analysis are likely to exceed 
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 145.  See generally Cox & Baucom, supra note 4, at 1840–43 (examining “recent signs” 
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 147.  Sherwin, supra note 121, at 53–58. 
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its costs.”
148
 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has explored the D.C. Circuit’s holdings in cases 
challenging the SEC’s rulemaking in the area of securities regulations since 
1990.  While the D.C. Circuit invalidated the SEC rule in question in each 
of the eight challenges before it, the most recent decision, Business 
Roundtable II, constitutes a turning point in judicial review of SEC action.  
By undertaking aggressive substantive review of the SEC’s economic 
analysis and empirical reasoning, the D.C. Circuit engaged in 
unprecedented heightened judicial scrutiny towards the SEC and set forth 
new (if vague) demands for extensive empirical basis and cost-benefit 
analysis in SEC rulemaking.  The case thus raises questions about the 
SEC’s future rulemaking ability and whether it will be able to make 
falsifiable empirically-based cases for its rules that the court could deem 
adequate. 
With the relationship between the judiciary and the SEC at a clear 
crossroads and a phenomenon of judicial aggression identified, it is now 
important to think about the road ahead and the measures necessary to 
serve the public interest such that years of advances in corporate 
governance and regulation are not so easily—or inadvertently—
eviscerated. 
 
 
 148.  Sherwin, supra note 121, at 59. 
